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A Prudent Approach to Climate Change
John B. Kirkwood†
I. INTRODUCTION
John Kunich, an accomplished poker player as well as a distinguished environmental scholar, compares climate change policy to a
gamble. Indeed, in the title of his recent book, he asserts that it is the
“biggest gamble of all time.”1 The metaphor is apt. Despite years of research, a great deal of uncertainty exists about the central issues posed by
climate change: How large is the threat? How imminent is it? How much
can the world do to reduce the dangers? At what cost? Because of these
uncertainties, any effort to address climate change will inevitably be a
gamble. And the stakes are enormous. If nothing is done about climate
change, the planet may face environmental catastrophe. If governments
intervene aggressively, attempting to eliminate virtually all greenhouse
gas emissions, the result is likely to be massive unemployment.
Kunich’s solution to this monumental gamble, however, is disappointing. He does not recommend taking any steps to address climate
change. One may search his book in vain for a single strategy he thinks
ought to be adopted to reduce the adverse effects of climate change. His
article in this journal is similarly devoid of affirmative recommendations.2 Rather, he counsels caution: when the nation considers what steps
it ought to take, it should err on the side of doing too little rather than
doing too much. He recasts the familiar errors of decision theory as Type
P errors—errors from being too passive—and Type R errors—errors
from being too restless—and asserts that in dealing with climate change,
Type P errors are superior:
†

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Strategic Planning and Mission, Seattle University School
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Antitrust Institute. Many people have helped me understand the issues involved in climate change,
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1. See JOHN CHARLES KUNICH, BETTING THE EARTH: HOW WE CAN STILL WIN THE BIGGEST
GAMBLE OF ALL TIME (2010).
2. See John Charles Kunich, Open-Eyes Environmentalism, 1 SEATTLE J. ENVTL L.121 (2011).
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Type P errors tend to be the preferable form of risk in situations
very much like what we find in the climate change matrix—very
high cost of betting/intervening, low or dubious chance of success
from getting involved, and significant doubt as to the existence of a
genuine and serious threat.3

His article also recommends a hands-off approach, suggesting
the government address climate change only as a last resort:
Many concerns caution us to place climate change in the “last
resort” category. A combination of the uncertain efficacy of corrective measures, questions about the extent and imminence of harm
resulting from the unaltered status quo, and immense expenditures
and opportunity costs associated with intervention makes Type P errors the rational preference.4

This position rests, in essence, on two judgments—the costs of
intervention are very high while the benefits of action are highly uncertain. Both judgments may be correct, but they strike me as too pessimistic. There are certainly steps the government could take that are not extremely expensive, and some of them seem to have a reasonable prospect
of producing significant benefits. In other words, there may be costeffective ways to address climate change—policies that are likely to reduce the risk of an environmental catastrophe without devastating the
economy. Despite the costs and uncertainties involved, despite the size of
the gamble, there may be a prudent approach to climate change. In this
article, I outline one.
I begin, in Part II, by emphasizing something that Kunich fully
acknowledges—the worst-case climate change scenario is truly catastrophic. If climate change is allowed to proceed without any mitigation
efforts, the results could be calamitous. While the probability of such a
disaster may not be high, it is not zero. There is a real risk of enormous
harm to the world, its people, and its species. Given the gravity of the
consequences, the implication is clear: if the governments of the world
can identify policies that would reduce the risk of such a catastrophe at
acceptable cost, they should pursue them.
In Part III, I consider what those policies might be. I look initially at the costs of government intervention, noting that the United States
and much of the world have just emerged from a major recession and the
prospects for rapid growth in employment and output in most countries
remain poor. As a result, immediate, dramatic action to combat climate
change would be unwise. Humanity should not, as Kunich puts it, make
3. KUNICH, supra note 1, at 342.
4. Kunich, supra note 2, at 130.
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an “all in” bet to combat global warming; the costs to the world’s economies would be too great. At the same time, in light of the risk of a catastrophe, it is far from clear that nothing should be done. In second portion
of Part III, I look at the principal forms of governmental response to climate change and suggest two policies that seem likely to be cost effective: (1) limits on greenhouse gas emissions that are initially modest but
gradually escalate, and (2) government support for clean energy research
and development.
In Part IV, I address whether developed nations should adopt
these policies (particularly the first) if China and other rapidly developing countries refuse to follow. China, India, and other emerging economies already account for a large share of greenhouse gas emissions, and
these countries have expressed reluctance to take steps that would inhibit
their economic growth, at least until they reach a level of development
comparable to nations like the United States. Here again, Kunich is correct: the participation of these countries is sufficiently important, both to
the prospects of mitigating climate change and to the United States’
ability to compete in global markets, that developed nations should not
take major steps without commitments from these countries. But there
are diplomatic tools that can be used to encourage participation, and
some may be particularly effective in inducing China and other rapidly
developing nations to act.
II. THE SEVERITY OF THE THREAT
There is little doubt that the world is warming. In a recent article
in the prestigious journal Nature, Quirin Schiermeier notes that “the most
recent decade was the warmest on record.”5 He also points out that the
“current rate of warming is in all likelihood unique in the history of humankind.”6 To be sure, there is no definitive evidence that humans have
contributed to this alarming rise in temperatures. Average world temperatures have risen before only to fall later, and these cycles occurred
long before industrialization began injecting large quantities of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Is it possible that the globe is simply
experiencing another cycle in the world’s weather? Schiermeier is doubtful. He states that there is a substantial support for the fundamental conclusion that humans are warming the climate, specifically “the extreme
rate of the twentieth-century temperature changes and the inability of

5. Quirin Schiermeier, The Real Holes in Climate Science, 463 NATURE 284, 286 (2010).
6. Id.
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climate models to simulate such warming without including the role of
greenhouse-gas pollution.”7
As Kunich emphasizes, not everyone agrees that humans have
played a significant role in global warming. Nor is it certain that rising
temperatures, if left unchecked for decades, would cause devastating
damage to the environment and its inhabitants. There is widespread
agreement, however, that climate change poses a major threat to the
world. In the very title of his book, Kunich characterizes the policy decision as “Betting the Earth.”8 His article calls climate change a “megamagnitude” challenge that involves the “fate and survival of our planet.”9
He states: “Challenges facing the environment today are literally Earthshaking in their magnitude, with the potential to affect the entire planet
for hundreds of years to come, and beyond.”10
Peter Singer, a prominent bioethicist at Princeton, concurs. Debating Bjorn Lomborg in The Wall Street Journal, Singer cited a World
Health Organization study that found global warming has already resulted in more than a hundred thousand fatalities annually:
According to the World Health Organization, the rise in temperature
that occurred between the 1970s and 2004 is causing an additional
140,000 deaths every year (roughly equivalent to causing, every
week, as many deaths as occurred in the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11,
2001). The major killers are climate-sensitive diseases such as malaria, dengue and diarrhea, which is more common when there is a
lack of safe water. Malnutrition resulting from crops that fail because of high temperatures or low rainfall is also responsible for
many deaths.11

Singer also described the best known threat from global warming: rising sea levels, which would flood coastal areas, displace millions
of people, and make it harder for them to obtain the fresh water they
need. Singer wrote:

7. Id. at 284; see also id. at 286 (“Records of thermometer measurements over the past 150
years show a sharp temperature rise during recent decades that cannot be explained by any natural
pattern.”).
8. See KUNICH, supra note 1.
9. Kunich, supra note 2, at 122.
10. Id. at 121.
11. Peter Singer, Editorial, Does Helping the Planet Hurt the Poor? No, if the West Makes Sacrifices,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Jan.
22,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703779704576074333552233782.html. The counterpoint article is Bjørn Lomborg, Editorial, Does Helping the Planet Hurt the Poor? Yes, if We
Listen
to
Green
Extremists,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Jan.
22,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703779704576074360837994874.html.
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Fertile, densely settled delta regions in Egypt, Bangladesh, India
and Vietnam are at risk from rising sea levels … In 2007 the UN’s
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found that a temperature rise in the range of 2 to 2.4 degrees Celsius by 2080 would put
stress on water resources used by 1.2 billion people. Rising sea levels would expose, each year, an additional 16 million people to
coastal flooding. A temperature rise limited to two degrees by 2080
now seems about the best we can hope for, and recently there have
been alarming indications that sea level rises could be much greater
than the IPCC anticipated.12

These adverse consequences are especially troubling because
they would disproportionately affect some of the most vulnerable populations on earth. Climate change, in other words, not only places the environment at risk, it also threatens to worsen the plight of the worst off,
increasing economic inequality. Moreover, a warming globe will likely
produce more severe storms and raise the probability of famine, two
trends that could have dire consequences for many people. Finally, as
Kunich notes, climate change could lead to the extinction of numerous
species.
In the worst-case scenario, in short, climate change would have
extreme consequences for the planet and its inhabitants—killing, dislocating, sickening, starving, or otherwise harming millions of people and
extinguishing thousands of species. Although the likelihood of this scenario is unclear, it would be devastating if it occurs. On this issue, Kunich and Singer agree. In Singer’s words, there is a “very real risk that
climate change will turn out to be a disaster on an unprecedented
scale.”13
If nothing is done about climate change, in other words, the
world would court a whirlwind. It would not be prudent to incur such a
risk unless there were no cost-effective ways to mitigate it. Fortunately,
that does not appear to be the case. At least two forms of governmental
action, and perhaps several more, may reduce the adverse effects of climate change without incurring unacceptable costs.
III. COST-EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION
Kunich argues that, above all else, the United States should not
take drastic action to combat global warming. The nation should not
make an “all in” bet, committing a large proportion of its scarce resources to stopping climate change. While Kunich may feel that no governmental action would be cost-effective, a judgment that is questiona12. Singer, supra note 11.
13. Id.
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ble, I agree with him that dramatic action does not make sense at the
present time. The macroeconomic context is highly unfavorable to major
governmental intervention.
The United States is slowly emerging from the Great Recession,
one of the most serious financial crises in the nation’s history and the
worst since the Great Depression. The crisis led to a huge government
bailout of the finance sector, a substantial drop in national output, and a
large increase in unemployment. Two years into the recovery, unemployment remains high, with the ranks of the long-term unemployed
larger than at any time since the 1930s. Economic growth is halting and
painfully slow. Further, the federal government is incurring budget deficits that are unprecedented in absolute magnitude and proportionally
higher than at any other time since World War II. In the next few years,
moreover, the nation is unlikely to see a major improvement on any of
these fronts. Although economic growth is likely to pick up, unemployment is likely to fall, and the deficit is likely to be reduced, no serious
forecast predicts a sharp, sustained rebound in any of these areas.
At the present time, then, a ban on most greenhouse gas emissions would be unwise. Such a draconian restriction on traditional energy
use would seriously harm a fragile and slow-growing economy and swell
the ranks of the unemployed. While a ban would reduce the likelihood of
an environmental catastrophe, the probability of such a disaster does not
seem to be so high that it would be prudent to throw the economy into
reverse, multiplying job losses, depressing income and wealth, and widening the government deficit. The prudent path lies somewhere between
doing absolutely nothing about climate change and doing everything
possible.
Some form of limited government intervention, in short, is the
most the nation can handle at the present time. Indeed, with control of
the government split between Republicans and Democrats, that is the
most that can be accomplished politically as well. Moreover, since any
climate change decision is fraught with uncertainty, any future policy
should adhere, to the extent possible, to the following principles, all of
which are useful in making decisions under uncertainty. First, the government should diversify its approaches. That is, an attack on the problem should come on multiple fronts rather than relying exclusively on a
single approach. Second, the government should experiment. It should
see how each policy works and then adjust the policy and/or the resources devoted to it accordingly. Finally, the government should seek
ancillary benefits. That is, in selecting approaches, priority should be
given to those that will achieve other goals. Thus, even if a policy ends
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up having relatively little impact on global warming, it will have positive
effects in other areas.
The most promising approaches to climate change fall into three
broad categories: (1) limits on greenhouse gas emissions; (2) adaptation;
and, (3) clean energy research and development.
A. Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Congress could limit greenhouse gas emissions in a variety of
ways. It could put a ceiling on them, it could combine ceilings with tradable emission permits (cap and trade), it could impose a tax on emissions, or it could direct the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
regulate them through the Clean Air Act. These methods differ in how
easily they may be administered and how cost-effective they may be. In a
longer article, I would compare them and evaluate their relative desirability; in this article, I will address a broader issue: How severe should
the limits be? Whatever method Congress chooses, how far should the
government go in attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?
One prominent proposal would limit emissions to such an extent
that the global mean temperature does not rise more than two degrees
Celsius by the end of this century. This approach would not preserve the
environmental status quo, but it would forestall more alarming temperature increases. It would also be quite costly. Studies of the issue have
concluded that emissions limits of this magnitude would result in a reduction of approximately 1–2 percent in total economic output. While
this sacrifice does not seem large in percentage terms, it is substantial in
absolute terms. In a $15 trillion economy, a 1–2 percent reduction in
GDP would mean $150-300 billion in lost output each year, a difference
large enough to provide health insurance to 10–20 million families.14 A
reduction in output of that magnitude could also increase unemployment
by 1–2 million people.15

14. This figure is based on the average cost to provide a U.S. household with health insurance,
a figure around $14,000 a year and rising. See Press Release, Kaiser Family Foundation, Family
Health Premiums Rise 3 Percent to $13,770 in 2010, But Workers' Share Jumps 14 Percent as Firms
Shift Cost Burden (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.kff.org/insurance/090210nr.cfm.
15. This follows from “Okun’s Law,” a rule of thumb developed by Arthur Okun that relates
changes in unemployment to changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It suggests that a percentage point decline in GDP is roughly associated with a percentage point increase in unemployment.
At present, the national unemployment rate is 9.1 percent, the labor force consists of approximately 150 million people, and there are more than 13 million people unemployed. As a ballpark estimate, therefore, a decline in GDP of 1-2 percent would increase unemployment by at least 1-2 million people. Economic and employment data is compiled and published by the U.S. Dept. of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT SITUATION,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.toc.htm (last visited June 13, 2011).
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These are large costs, and it is probably not sensible to incur
them in the short run, given the state of the economy and the uncertainties about the size, impact, and reversibility of global warming that Kunich has described. It seems prudent to begin with modest measures, then
increase them over time, particularly if experience (and growing knowledge of climate change) suggests that increases are in order.
Michael Porter, one of the world’s leading authorities on business strategy, and Daniel Esty, a former EPA official and current environmental law professor at Yale, recommend such an approach. They
propose “an emissions charge of $5 per ton of greenhouse gases beginning in 2012, rising to $100 per ton by 2032.”16 They note that the “low
initial charge, starting next year, would make the short-term burden on
consumers and businesses almost negligible.”17 They also stress that their
proposal would have numerous ancillary benefits. Imposing a price on
carbon would reduce the U.S. trade deficit because less oil would be imported. For the same reason, fewer dollars would flow to violent fundamentalists in oil-rich nations, enhancing national security. The carbon
charge would also curtail air pollution by decreasing the combustion of
fossil fuels. And the federal deficit is likely to be reduced because of the
additional tax revenue generated by the carbon charge. Finally, their proposal would stimulate innovation:
In the longer term, the prospect of a steadily rising emissions charge
would focus the private sector’s attention on energy-saving and carbon-reducing innovation. The calculus for investments would immediately change. Anyone pursuing an energy-consuming project,
like a power plant, would factor in the rising long-term charge into
their choice of technology … Entrepreneurial spirit would be unleashed in companies from multinational enterprises to back-of-thegarage inventors.18

Even this proposal may be too ambitious. It is not clear that
emission charges should escalate as rapidly as Porter and Esty propose;
given the current state of the economy, a more moderate rate of increase
may be preferable. But whether the cost increase is rapid or gradual, it
makes sense to create a fixed schedule so as to make investment planning
16. Daniel C. Esty & Michael E. Porter, Pain at the Pump? We Need More, NEW YORK TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2011, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/opinion/28esty.html.
17. Id.
18. Esty & Porter, supra note 16. In a recent column, Thomas L. Friedman cited similar ancillary benefits in making the case for a tax on carbon emissions. See Thomas L. Friedman, Bibi and
Barak,
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
May
18,
2011,
at
A19,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/opinion/18friedman.html (“We are going to have to raise taxes.
Why not a carbon tax that also reduces energy consumption, drives innovation, cleans the air and
reduces our dependence on the Middle East?”).
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easier. Without a reliable schedule, entrepreneurs and businesses would
have a more difficult time estimating the future cost of carbon-based
energy and thus a harder time calculating whether clean-energy projects
would be financially worthwhile. To stimulate innovation, in short, a
fixed schedule is desirable, even though it would commit the government
for a period of time to prescribed emission limits, reducing the government’s ability to experiment and adjust.
B. Adaptation
Emission limits are intended to curb the extent of future climate
change. Adaptation strategies are designed to help people cope with the
effects of climate change that is likely to occur whatever emission limits
are adopted. For example, governments can provide food, water, and relocation assistance to residents whose lands are likely to flooded by rising sea levels. At the present time, however, relatively few people need
such assistance. While residents may need shelter and other help after a
hurricane or tornado, such emergency relief is largely available through
existing government and humanitarian sources.
To be sure, climate change may increase the frequency and intensity of such storms, as well as exacerbate the incidence of drought and
famine, but predicting in advance which countries are likely to be most
affected is difficult. As one scientist observed, “Our current climate
models are just not up to informed decision-making at the resolution of
most countries.”19 At this time, then, it seems premature to commit large
amounts of additional resources to adaptation assistance. The United
States may need to make such commitments in the future, but other climate change strategies are more pressing in the short term.
C. Clean Energy Research and Development
The ideal solution to climate change is the development of new
forms of energy generation that are both cheap and clean. These technological breakthroughs would use few resources to produce power and
would emit no greenhouse gases or pollutants. Moreover, they could take
any form: they could be a radically different type of energy from anything available now, or they could be a dramatic improvement on an existing source of power generation, like wind or solar.
The allure of such a prize motivates many people to recommend
clean energy research and development. Esty and Porter, for example,
advocate escalating charges on greenhouse gas emissions in part because
they would make it more profitable for businesses and entrepreneurs to
19. See Schiermeier, supra note 5, at 285.
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engage in clean energy research and development. As they note, a price
on carbon would also give consumers as well as producers an increasingly powerful incentive to switch to whatever new, less carbon-intensive
technologies are developed.20 Likewise, Bjorn Lomborg supports increased research and development, though he believes governments
should fund it directly rather than stimulate it through emissions taxes,
which he believes would prove too harmful to economic growth. Lomborg is quite willing, however, to commit substantial funds to research
and development, declaring: “[W]e should spend about $100 billion a
year on research and development to make green energy cheaper and
more widely available.”21 Singer also endorses the “need for more investment in research and development,” whether it is funded directly by
the government or stimulated by some type of emission limit.22
Government-sponsored research and development is not without
problems. The government would have to choose which projects to fund,
and decisions made by government agencies are more likely to be politically motivated and less likely to be commercially sound than decisions
made by entrepreneurs with an economic interest in success.23 But government-funded research has historically led to spectacular successes
(e.g., the Internet, GPS), and much of it has probably been more useful
than wasteful. Moreover, unlike limits on carbon emissions, governmentsponsored research is likely to have an entirely stimulative effect on the
economy.
In short, a prudent approach to climate change should consist of
two elements: (1) substantial government funding for clean energy research and development, and (2) limits on greenhouse gas emissions that
begin at a modest level but gradually escalate in accord with a predetermined schedule.24 Even this moderate program, however, is unlikely to

20. For the same reasons, Friedman recommends a tax on carbon emissions. See Friedman, supra note 18.
21. Lomborg, supra note 11.
22. Singer, supra note 11 (“Such investment could be funded by a carbon tax or, under a capand-trade scheme, by the sale of quotas to emit carbon. Either of these methods of putting a price on
carbon would in itself create further economic incentive for the development of green energy.”).
23. See Esty & Porter, supra note 16 (“Experience in fields like information technology and
telecommunications suggests that creating demand for innovation is far more effective than subsidizing company-specific research projects or providing incentives for particular technologies. Governments just aren’t good at picking winners; witness the billions wasted on corn-based ethanol subsidies.”).
24. As noted earlier, there are many types of emission limits. I favor taxes over ceilings because the former are easier to calculate and administer, and send clearer signals to other businesses.
But the choice among types is not critical. As Singer indicated, any type of limit will put a price on
greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, ceilings are likely to be easier to enact than new taxes.
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be adopted if China, India, and other rapidly developing countries refuse
to participate.
IV. CHINA AND OTHER RAPIDLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The developing countries have a sympathetic argument for refusing to take major steps to limit greenhouse gas emissions. The United
States and other developed countries have historically been the world’s
largest source of greenhouse gas emissions. For years, they poured large
quantities of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as their economies
expanded and their citizens attained an increasingly high standard of living. Why shouldn’t China, India, and other developing countries be allowed to do the same thing until their citizens achieve a comparable level
of prosperity?
The answer is simple: no major emitter of greenhouse gases is
likely to limit its emission unless other major emitters do so as well. The
United States and Europe may devote substantial funds to research and
development, but the international community is unlikely to adopt material and binding restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions unless China
and India make comparable commitments.
Neither the U.S. nor the EU will allow themselves to be placed at
a competitive disadvantage relative to these countries. Moreover, the adverse effects of climate change are unlikely to be reduced substantially
unless all the major emitters act together; greenhouse gas emissions and
climate change do not respect national boundaries. As a result, the developed countries and the leading developing nations are engaged in what
Kunich calls “the longest and highest-stakes game of ‘Chicken’ in history, with all key players daring the others to move first.”25
Unless this collective action problem is solved, the world is unlikely to do anything important about climate change until a calamity
occurs.26 To move forward, therefore, the United States and the European
Union should agree on a program they would implement if China, India,
and other rapidly developing nations agree to follow, and then use diplomatic and other tools to bring these countries into line. For instance,
25. See Kunich, supra note 2, at 131. (“The United States never even ratified the Kyoto Protocol because of concerns that its economy would be placed at a major disadvantage compared to its
burgeoning competitive rivals, including [greenhouse gas] giants such as China and India. The United States’ inertia is complemented by the reluctance of such emerging/developing economic powers
to accept restrictions on their own emissions that could disrupt their progress before reaching a level
of prosperity, quality of life, and social stability similar to that of the United States.”).
26. China may take some actions that are grounded in its own interests, like imposing penalties
on inefficient power plants, since those actions reduce its own air pollution and lower its own energy
costs. But China is unlikely to curb greenhouse gas emissions in a much more substantial way, unless other large emitters do at least as much.
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the U.S. and EU could offer increased economic cooperation and investment as a reward for participation. In addition, they could threaten to
impose trade sanctions if China, India, and other major developing nations do not adopt comparable emissions limits. To be sure, trade sanctions may provoke a trade war, which could lead to worldwide reductions
in employment, output, and economic growth. But to end the game of
Chicken and reduce the risk of an environmental catastrophe, the threat
of a major economic disruption may be needed.
V. CONCLUSION
A prudent approach to climate change would not ignore the
problem. The risks of inaction are too significant. If the world fails to
take steps to avert global warming and simply waits to see what transpires, future generations may witness a human and environmental disaster of the first magnitude. At the same time, it would be unwise to impose major, immediate curbs on greenhouse gas emissions, given the
uncertainties that pervade this area and the precarious state of most
economies. A prudent approach to climate change would consist of moderate steps that have a reasonable chance of being cost effective.
In this article, I suggest two: (1) substantial government funding
for clean energy research and development, and (2) limits on greenhouse
gas emissions that are initially modest but gradually escalate in accord
with a predetermined schedule. Both steps would move the economy
away from traditional, carbon-based sources of energy and toward technologies that would have fewer adverse effects on the world’s climate.
The increase in funding for R&D would simulate innovation directly; the
emissions limits would do so indirectly, making it more costly for producers and consumers to use older, more carbon-intensive technologies
and more advantageous to develop cleaner alternatives. Both policies,
moreover, could be expanded or accelerated if the risks of climate
change appear greater or more likely than they do now.
If this program is in fact sensible, it will be easier to persuade
China, India, and other emerging economies to adopt something comparable. And if more than persuasion is required, there are diplomatic and
other tools available, including the threat of trade sanctions if these countries insist on free riding on the climate change efforts of the developed
world.
Kunich is right: climate change policy is a gamble. But since we
are “betting the earth,” it is a game we should not sit out.

